No. This conclusion is supported by language in AGLO 1970 No. 89 which provides:

The key phrase in RCW 42.23.030, pertinent to your inquiry, describes as prohibited those contracts which "...may be made by, through or under the supervision of such officer, in whole or in part,..." This statute does not in express terms declare illegal or void any contract which preexisted the appointment or election of the officer to his position of conflict...

So the prohibition does not appear to apply if the contract was entered into prior to the person assuming the office of councilmember.

The answer depends on the size and class of the city and on how much this person would earn as a city employee. Since an employment relationship is contractual, this situation is governed by the statutory conflict of interest law dealing with contractual interests by municipal officials. Ch. 42.23 RCW. That law provides that no officer may be beneficially (i.e., financially) interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract made by, through, or under the supervision of the officer. RCW 42.23.030. Because the city council has ultimate authority over contracts (although the mayor appoints employees), this conflict of interest prohibition is implicated in this situation. However, the prohibition is subject to certain specific exceptions, including one that applies to contracts the total volume of which does not exceed $18,000 in a calendar year. RCW 42.23.030(6) . However, this exception is not available to cities or towns over 10,000 or to first class cities.

Thus, a councilmember, in all but cities of over 10,000 population and first class cities, may be employed by the city as long as he or she is not paid more than $18,000 in a calendar year. However, the councilmember should not be involved in any consideration of the salary for that particular position. In first class cities, the charter may provide for a specific exemption from this prohibition.

Absent a separate property agreement, a person may not serve as a city councilmember and be married to a city employee, unless the employee is also an officer of the city or earns less than $18,000 in a calendar year and the city has a population of less than 10,000. See RCW 42.23.030(6). Since employment is considered a contractual matter and because of community property laws, the councilmember would have a prohibited interest in a contract between a spouse who is an employee of the city and the city, unless the noted exception applies.

RCW 42.23.030 basically prohibits a councilmember in cities over 10,000 population from having a contract interest with the city. However, in cities with a population of less than 10,000, there is an exception for contract interests of less than $18,000. RCW 42.23.030 was actually amended in 1999 by Ch. 261, Laws of 1999 to increase this limit from the previous limit of $9,000. This change became effective on July 25, 1999.

The word "contract" includes employment, sales, purchases, leases, and other financial transactions of a contractual nature. As a general rule councilmembers are more broadly impacted than other city officials because city contracts are made or directly approved under the supervision of the council. In addition to the prohibition against both direct and indirect financial interests, a city officer is also prohibited from receiving financial benefits from anyone else having a contract with the city if the benefits are in any way connected with the contract.

This exception only applies to cities that are under 10,000 population. Councilmembers in cities over 10,000 population are prohibited from having any contract interest with the city.

There would be no conflict of interest, since the lease was entered into prior to the lessee becoming a city official. However, the lessee/councilmember could not renew the existing lease, renegotiate the lease, execute a new lease upon expiration of the existing lease, or exercise the option to purchase the property, without first resigning from the council. RCW 42.23.030(6) prohibits a city from leasing or selling property to a municipal officer. Renewal of the lease or exercise of an option to purchase, even if both lease renewal and the option to purchase are provided for in the existing lease, would be a conflict of interest.

In code cities this is specifically prohibited if that office is within the city. RCW 35A.12.030. A similar statutory prohibition exists with respect to the office of county auditor. RCW 36.22.110. With respect to other public offices and to other classes of cities, and to counties, the answer is governed in each particular case by the "doctrine of incompatible offices."

In general, offices are incompatible when the nature and duties of the two are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both. Some of the issues to consider in determining incompatibility are whether or not the functions of the two positions are inconsistent, such as where one is subordinate to the other, or where there is an antagonism or conflict which would result in the attempt by one person to discharge faithfully and impartially the duties of both positions. Two offices are said to be incompatible when the office holder cannot in every instance discharge the duties of both.

Where the second office is outside the city or county, incompatibility may exist based on the interaction between the jurisdictions involved; incompatibility arises where that interaction may result in conflicting interests or loyalties in a given situation. Thus, the attorney general's office has concluded, for example, that the offices of mayor and county commissioner and of mayor and port commissioner of a district that encompasses the city are incompatible offices.

A threshold question in applying the doctrine of incompatibility is whether the position at issue is a public "office." The state supreme court has adopted a five element test for determining whether an employment position is an "office." This test can be applied in situations where it may not be clear whether a position is an office:

1. [It] must be created by the Constitution or by the legislature or by a municipality or other body through authority conferred by the legislature;
2. It must possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public;
3. The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must be defined, directly or impliedly, by the legislature or through legislative authority;
4. The duties must be performed independently and without control of a superior power, other than the law, unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office created or authorized by the legislature and by it placed under the general control of a superior officer or body;
5. It must have some permanency and continuity and not be only temporary or occasional. In addition, in this state, an officer must take and file an official oath, . . . and give an official bond if the latter be required by proper authority.

State ex rel. Brown v. Blew, 20 Wn.2d 47, 145 P.2d 554 (1944).

Under this doctrine, it is unlikely, for example, that the mayor would be able to hold any other office in a city, because all non-elective offices are subordinate to the mayor. Also, a city council position, or county commissioner or county council position will usually be considered incompatible with holding another public office in the city or county based on the council's or commission's general authority over the budget and over contracts. That general authority will often be inconsistent with the interests of an officer whose department or whose duties are tied to budgetary and/or contractual issues.

A county commissioner may not purchase or lease property (real or personal) from the county, regardless of the value of the property. There is an absolute statutory prohibition that applies here. RCW 42.23.030(6). It does not matter how the property is purchased; an impartial bidding or auction sale would not eliminate the conflict.

Note, however, that if a commissioner is a lessee of county property when he or she enters office, the lease would not be invalidated. Nevertheless, it could not be renewed if its term expired during the commissioner's term of office.

Because the statutory prohibition applies only to county officers, a county employee may purchase property from the county.  A county may adopt  a stricter standard in its own personnel policies in regard to employees making purchases of property from the county.

The same prohibition applies to city councilmembers and mayors in regard to purchasing or leasing property from their city.

This situation comes up frequently, and, unfortunately, there is no specific rule in this state, other than general conflict of interest principles. If the position of mayor is unpaid or is paid the same amount as a councilmember, there would be no financial conflict of interest. Nevertheless, case law from other states indicates a general rule that, regardless of any financial interest, a public officer may not vote for himself or herself for appointment to a position except where that position must be filled from the membership of the body on which that officer serves. Thus, under this exception, a councilmember may vote for himself or herself for mayor pro tem, because that position must be filled by a councilmember.

If the position of mayor involves an increase in compensation, general conflict of interest principles would seem to preclude voting for oneself for this position. Despite the fact that it may often happen that councilmembers do vote for themselves, without adverse legal consequence, the safest course is not to vote for oneself to fill a mayoral vacancy.

In most instances, this would be prohibited by state anti-discrimination law because this would constitute discrimination on the basis of marital status. RCW 49.60.180 declares that it is an unfair practice for any employer to discriminate against a person because of age, sex, or marital status, among other things. A provision in a county or city personnel policy which prohibits the spouse of an employee from also working for the county or city may be in violation of this statutory provision.

The state Human Rights Commission has adopted regulations which implement this anti-discrimination law. These regulations indicate that there are certain circumstances where business necessity may justify what otherwise would be considered discrimination on the basis of marital status. Situations where it is not unlawful for a county or city to prohibit the spouse of an employee from working for the county or city include where one spouse would have the authority or power to supervise, appoint, remove, or discipline the other spouse. A business necessity justification might also occur where one spouse would be responsible for auditing the work of the other spouse. Other examples are specified in the state regulation. Thus, a county or city should not have a general policy prohibiting employment of spouses except in certain such business necessity situations.

Yes. Nothing prohibits a husband and wife from serving on the council at the same time. However, in some situations, such as in the consideration of a quasi-judicial matter, there may be an appearance of fairness problem with having both spouses participate.

Because of the community property interest that a person has in the earnings of a spouse in this state, the analysis of this question is the same as that for the question of whether a councilmember may also be a city employee. However, the conflict of interest in this situation can be avoided if the spouses enter into a separate property agreement, under which the earnings of each spouse would be considered separate property and would not be used in any way for the benefit of the marital community.

Yes. A councilmember may serve as a volunteer fire fighter, volunteer ambulance personnel, or a reserve police officer if authorized by a two-thirds vote of the council. See RCW 35.21.770 and RCW 35A.11.110.