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SUBJECTS › PLANNING › Planning Commission References
Reference Sources for Planning Commission
Published 04/09

Reference Sources for Planning Commission

Contents

State Statutes - Planning Commission



Selected Washington Court Decisions

  • Concerned Coupeville Citizens v. Town of Coupeville, 62 Wn. App. 408, 417, review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1004 (1991). Excerpt:

    It is clear that under RCW 35.63.060, a planning commission "may act as the research and fact finding agency of the municipality." A commission acting in such a capacity, however, does not possess fact-finding powers that are final and unreviewable by the municipality. This is made clear by the terms of RCW 35.63.120, which empowers the council or board to "modify or disaffirm any decision of the commission."

  • Buchsieb/Danard, Inc. v. Skagit County, 31 Wn. App. 489, 492-493 (1982), aff'd, 99 Wn.2d 577 (1983). Excerpt:

    The planning enabling act, RCW 36.70, authorizes the creation of a planning commission by the Board of Commissioners. RCW 36.70.030. The act provides that reports and recommendations of the planning commission relating to plats, subdivisions and other "official controls" are advisory only, the final decision as to such controls resting with the county board. RCW 36.70.020(11); RCW 36.70.650; Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn.2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955); D.E.B.T., Ltd. v. Board of Clallam County Comm'rs, 24 Wn. App. 136, 600 P.2d 628 (1979). The state subdivision statute, RCW 58.17, is to the same effect. RCW 58.17.100 clearly establishes that the legislative body has the ultimate power to either adopt or reject the planning commission decision on a preliminary plat.

  • D.E.B.T., Ltd. v. Board of Clallam County Comm'rs, 24 Wn. App. 136, (1979). Excerpt:

    The primary issue in this case turns on whether the Board of County Commissioners had authority to reject the recommendation of the planning commission and require that the proposed development comply with SEPA. HN1A planning commission normally functions as a fact-finding tribunal. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wn.2d 858, 869, 480 P.2d 489 (1971); State ex rel. Gunning v. Odell, 58 Wn.2d 275, 278, 362 P.2d 254 (1961). Unless a statute or ordinance provides to the contrary, authority is generally limited to that of an advisory administrative body, and its [*139] recommendations are not binding but are subject to final approval by the legislative body of the municipality. 8A E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations &sec; 25.226, at 128 (3d ed. 1976). See also Lauterbach v. Centralia, 49 Wn.2d 550, 558, 304 P.2d 656 (1956); Ferris v. Alhambra, 189 Cal. App. 2d 517, 11 Cal. Rptr. 475, 477 (1961). RCW 35.63, which authorizes the creation of planning commissions and the adoption of comprehensive plans by municipalities within the state, gives to planning commissions only the power to make recommendations to the Board of County Commissioners. RCW 35.63.060. 1 See also RCW 35.63.100. The adoption or rejection of such recommendations is in the sound discretion of the Board, see Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn.2d 629, 633, 289 P.2d 203 (1955), and the Board may disaffirm any decision of the planning commission. RCW 35.63.120.

  • Lutz v. Longview, 83 Wn.2d 566, 570 (1974). Excerpt:

    Turning to RCW 35A.63 we find a clear separation of functions and powers between the planning body and the municipal legislative body, the city council in this case. The planning agency prepares the comprehensive plan, RCW 35A.63.060, but "the final form and content of the comprehensive plan shall be determined by the legislative body." RCW 35A.63.072. All amendments, modifications or alterations to the comprehensive plan are determined in the same fashion. RCW 35A.63.073. Only the legislative body is empowered to adopt a zoning map and ordinance. RCW 35A.63.100. Obviously the state has vested the authority to zone and rezone solely in the city council.

    The next step is recognition of the rule that the city council has no inherent power to delegate this legislative authority, State ex rel. Bowen v. Kruegel, 67 Wn.2d 673, 409 P.2d 458 (1965), and no such power has been granted by the statute. In fact, RCW 35A.63.120 authorizes only the delegation of administrative and enforcement responsibilities, thereby negating delegation of the legislative act of rezoning the property in question. Moreover, if the city's position were valid as to rezoning under a planned unit development, there is no reason why the planning commission could not be authorized to do every act of zoning and rezoning. Any fair reading of the statute indicates that such conclusion is totally contrary to the separation of functions clearly delineated in the statute.

  • Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wn.2d 858, 869 (1971). Excerpt:

    Whatever descriptive characterization may be otherwise attached to the role or function of the planning commission in zoning procedures, e.g., advisory, recommendatory, investigatory, administrative or legislative, it is manifest under the statutory scheme of RCW 36.70 that it is a public agency, established pursuant to state statute, composed of appointive -- as distinguished from elective -- public officers, a principal and statutory duty of which is to conduct public hearings in specified planning and zoning matters, enter findings of fact -- often on the basis of disputed facts -- and make recommendations with reasons assigned thereto. Certainly, in its role as a hearing and fact-finding tribunal, the planning commission's function more nearly than not partakes of the nature of an administrative, quasi-judicial proceeding, implicit in which is the basic due process requirement that the hearing and fact-finding process must be fair and impartial.