Civil Service Court Decisions and AG Opinions
This page highlights key court decisions and legal interpretations regarding Washington State civil service laws listed by topic.
For a general overview of the state civil service regulations, see our page Civil Service.
When Is Civil Service Required?
If the size of the police force does not exceed two officers, the city need not provide for civil service and its police officers are terminable at will.
Jordan v. Oakville (1986) – RCW 41.12.010 and RCW 41.12.030 only require civil service in cities with police forces of “more than two persons including the police chief” and “fully paid” police officers. Construing these two statutes together, “they only require cities to establish civil service if they have a police force consisting of three or more fully paid police officers.” Police employees in departments below that threshold are not covered by civil service and are terminable at will.
A fire district is free to adopt its own system which "substantially accomplishes" the purposes of the firefighter civil service statute (Ch. 41.08 RCW).
Roberts v. Fire Protection Dist. (1986) – Former RCW 52.36.060 (which the Legislature has since recodified at RCW 52.30.040) allows but does not require fire districts to adopt civil service systems that "substantially accomplish" the purposes of chapter 41.08 RCW (the firefighter civil service statute).
Personnel Covered by Civil Service Requirements
Exclusion of noncommissioned city police personnel from a city police department civil service system does not "substantially accomplish" the purpose of the police civil service statute (Ch. 41.12 RCW).
Teamsters v. Moses Lake (1993) – Reading RCW 41.12.220 and RCW 41.12.050 together, civil service requirements cover all full-time police department employees (including positions like full-time utility officers, communications officers and clerks)—not just a department’s full time police officers. Excluded positions would be reservists and part-time personnel.
Addresses questions pertaining to civil service commissions in certain fire protection districts.
AGO 1968 No. 16 – Fire protection districts can choose to provide civil service coverage for their paid full-time firefighters under RCW 52.36.060 (now RCW 52.30.040). If a district chooses to do so, they are governed by chapter 41.08 RCW to the same extent as a city or town, and civil service will apply to all of their paid full-time firefighters (even in districts that also employ volunteers).
If a fire protection district has a civil service system for its paid full-time firefighters under RCW 52.36.060 (now RCW 52.30.040), the district’s commissioners cannot simultaneously serve on its civil service commission.
Civil service commission lacks authority to place warrant server, part of municipal court, under control of commission.
Massie v. Brown (1974) – City civil service commissions cannot extend civil service status to a municipal court “warrant server” position. Giving civil service commission jurisdiction over a court position improperly invades the judiciary’s independence.
Localities Can Adopt their Own Civil Service Rules that "Substantially Accomplish" State Civil Service Law Purposes
A local existing civil service commission only "substantially accomplishes" state civil service requirements if it can review all matters related to state civil service law.
Yakima v. Yakima Police & Fire Civil Service Comm’n. (1981) – A firefighter appealed a letter of reprimand to the city’s civil service commission. The city argued that the commission had no ability to review the letter because commission rules only allowed it to review removals, suspensions, demotions or discharges (not reprimands). The court disagreed, holding that local civil service rules only substantially accomplish state law purposes if they enable commissions to review all “matters touching the enforcement and effect” of state civil service law. Strictly limiting a commission’s review only to “matters of removal, suspension, demotion, or discharge” removes its “ability to substantially accomplish that which the legislature mandated by state civil service law—i.e., a system based upon merit principles to govern discipline of civil service employees.”
Local "Rules of Three" and “Rules of Five” substantially accomplish the purposes of state civil service laws.
Fire Fighters v. Walla Walla (1978) – A local fire civil service practice of certifying three eligible appointee names to the appointing authority substantially accomplishes chapter 41.08 RCW purposes. Although the statute only requires certification of a single highest eligible candidate to fill a vacancy, the court found that the legislature did not intend to require such a “rule of one” in local civil service systems, and that a local “rule of three” substantially accomplished chapter 41.08 RCW purposes by enabling the appointing power to exercise a choice in filling positions.
Seattle Police Officers' Guild v. City of Seattle (2004) – A Seattle civil service rule allowed the police chief to fill positions from the top five candidates certified by the civil service commission. The court found that this “Rule of five” substantially accomplished the purposes of chapter 41.12 RCW because of its historical roots and its similarity to a “Rule of Three” that courts have previously upheld. However, the court struck down another provision in Seattle’s rules that allowed the chief to select candidates from either the top five or the top 25% of candidates (whichever produced the most candidates) because it gave the chief too much discretion and was inconsistent with chapter 41.12 RCW.
Hellum v. Johnson (1957) – Jurisdictions that use a “Rule of Three” can appoint any of the three highest eligible candidates the commission certifies—the jurisdiction’s appointments are not restricted to the first candidate on an eligible list.
Excluding full-time non-commissioned personnel from civil service does not substantially accomplish the purposes of state civil service law.
Teamsters v. Moses Lake (1993) – Excluding full time noncommissioned personnel from a city police department’s civil service system does not "substantially accomplish" the purposes of chapter 41.12 RCW.
A one-year probationary period is a valid local variation of the probationary period requirement (RCW 41.12.100).
Samuels v. Lake Stevens (1988) – RCW 41.12.100 requires civil service appointees to fulfill a probationary period of up to six months before their appointment is deemed complete. A city civil service rule requiring a one-year probationary period is a valid local variation of RCW 41.12.100 even though it is longer than six months. A one-year probationary period “substantially accomplishes” RCW 41.12.100 purposes of giving the employer a probationary period to evaluate a probationer’s performance.
Arbogast v. Westport (1977) – Civil service probationary periods give appointing officials an opportunity to assess appointed employee efficiency and competency. A city established a one-year probationary period for its police employees in light of widely fluctuating job demands at different times of the year. The court held that this lengthier probationary period "substantially accomplished" the purposes of the shorter 6 month period in RCW 41.12.100, so under RCW 41.12.010 the one-year period will be given effect.
A city civil service charter provision that removes a covered employee’s ability to appeal discipline does not "substantially accomplish" the purpose of chapter 41.12 RCW.
AGO 1986 No. 13 – A city charter provided that civil service employees could be suspended without pay “and without right of appeal.” The Attorney General opined that this local provision did not substantially accomplish the purposes of RCW 41.12.090, which allows civil service employees to appeal disciplinary decisions.
Conflicts Between Civil Service Rules and Collective Bargaining Agreements or Personnel Policies
Civil service laws do not supplant collective bargaining rights, and a collective bargaining agreement bargained for provisions will prevail over inconsistent civil service rules.
Spokane and Spokane Police Guild v. Spokane Civil Service Commission (1999) – A collective bargaining agreement’s bargained-for provisions will generally prevail over inconsistent civil service rules.
Rose v. Erickson (1986) – RCW 41.56.905 provides that the collective bargaining provisions in chapter 41.56 RCW control to the extent that they conflicts with “any other statute” (including chapter 41.14 RCW related to civil service). Accordingly, the civil service appeal procedures in RCW 41.14 do not preempt a collective bargaining agreement’s grievance procedures.
State civil service laws can preempt a county's personnel system.
Deputy Sheriff's Guild v. Commissioners (1979) – Under the state supremacy clause in Article 11, Sec. 11 of the State Constitution, the county sheriff civil service provisions in RCW 41.14 preempt and control over any conflicting provisions in a county personnel ordinance related to deputy sheriff selection, promotion and termination.
Qualifications of Secretary and Chief Examiner
A civil service commission’s secretary and chief examiner must be either an existing city employee or a city resident.
AGO 1989 No. 20 – RCW 41.08.040 and RCW 41.12.040 make city employment or city residence a qualification to serve as the secretary/chief examiner for a city fire or police civil service commission. These remain valid qualifications for the position despite the Legislature’s later passage of RCW 41.08.075 and 41.12.075 (which prohibit city residence requirements for other general civil service positions).
Qualifications of Civil Service Examinees and Employees
Residency as a qualification to obtain or continue civil service employment.
AGO 63-64 No. 36 – RCW 41.08.070 and RCW 41.12.070 do not allow city ordinances or civil service commission rules to require that city firefighters or police officers be city residents.
Bjorseth v. Seattle (1976) – RCW 35.21.200 prohibits cities and towns from using residence outside the jurisdiction as a ground to discharge or layoff civil service employees.
Civil service commissions have broad examination discretion, and can choose to open their exams to all qualified citizens or only to persons already in the service.
O'Brien v. Civil Serv. Commission (1976) – Civil service commissions have broad discretion to decide whether their employee examinations will be open to all qualified citizens or only to persons already in the service. See RCW 41.14.060(6).
Validity of age requirements for certain civil service employees.
AGO 1972 No. 12 – A county sheriff’s civil service commission cannot exclude all persons otherwise qualified under RCW 41.14.100 from applying for any sheriff’s department position simply because they are under age 21. However, that applicant age restriction would be valid if the position under examination required employees to enter taverns for law enforcement purposes.
Examinations and Appointments
Appointments and promotions are to be made from examinations.
State ex rel. Olson v. Seattle (1941) – Civil service generally requires appointments and promotions to be based on examinations. One cannot claim that performing a position’s duties gives them a “right” to the position.
Commission discretion in civil service examinations.
Stoor v. Seattle (1954) – Civil service commissions have wide discretion in examining applicants, and courts generally don’t interfere with a commission’s discretion unless its actions are invalid as capricious and arbitrary.
Simonds v. Kennewick (1985) – Commission actions are “arbitrary and capricious” if they are willful and unreasoning, without consideration and in disregard of facts and circumstances. Conversely, commissions do not act arbitrarily or capriciously when they act honestly and with due consideration of the facts and circumstances—even when there is room for two opinions. The court ruled that a fire department’s civil service examination was arbitrary and capricious because the department did not conduct it impartially as RCW 41.08.050 and the department’s civil service rules required, and because department favoritism could influence examinee grades.
Court invalidates a fire captain's exam in a city that insufficiently implemented civil service.
Higgins v. Salewsky (1977) – Unsuccessful fire captain examinees alleged that the city’s civil service commission conducted its exam in violation of its own rules and chapter 41.08 RCW. Evidence at trial showed that beyond the exam, the city had failed to establish a valid civil service system entirely: nearly all fire department promotions were based on seniority, no city ordinance or charter provision established a civil service system, and the city had not otherwise substantially complied with chapter 41.08 RCW. Accordingly, the court found that the city’s civil service commissioners could not hold office and the examination they gave was therefore invalid.
Civil service commissions must follow their own examination rules.
State ex rel. Mulkey v. Auburn (1962) – The court invalidated a civil service exam because the examiner failed to attend a portion of it, despite a commission rule requiring the examiner’s presence at all examinations. Commissions can exercise wide discretion when conducting examinations, but they cannot violate their own formally promulgated exam regulations.
Civil service examinees cannot get a court injunction to stop the commission from allowing other examinees.
Hall v. Elliott (1942) – City employees that were eligible for a promotional civil service examination sued for an injunction to stop the commission from allowing other unqualified employees to take the examination. The court ruled against the eligible employees. Injunctions require an actual and material injury—not an injury that is merely possible, doubtful or contingent. Here an injunction was improper since the qualified employees’ injury was only speculative. To illustrate, if the unqualified employees took the exam and failed, the qualified employees would suffer no injury at all.
Legal standing to challenge civil service exam results and appointments.
Casebere v. Civil Service Commission (1978) – A sheriff’s department promoted two deputies to lieutenant after a civil service exam. Other department employees who were ineligible to take the exam challenged the results in court. The court rejected the challenge, holding that the unqualified employees’ legal interest in the exam results is the same as those of general citizens, which isn’t enough to give them legal standing to challenge the exam results. Although RCW 41.14.060(3) allows citizens to bring matters to civil service commissions, this doesn’t mean that citizens are also entitled to review by courts.
Fridell v. Seattle Civil Service Commission (1971) – Persons that are unqualified for a particular civil service position have no legal standing to contest a qualified person’s appointment to the position.
Appointing authorities have discretion to appoint candidates to civil service vacancies.
Crippen v. Bellevue (1991) – A firefighter examinee was the only successful candidate on a battalion chief eligibility list. The fire chief nonetheless decided not to appoint the candidate based on other concerns about the candidate’s work. The candidate sued, arguing that the chief based his decision on reasons other than merit or fitness in violation of civil service law. The court disagreed, holding that civil service laws are designed to ensure appointments based on merit and fitness, but the laws do not remove all appointing authority discretion. Since RCW 41.08.100 only requires appointment from a certified eligibility list if the appointing authority “desires to fill a vacancy,” the chief had discretion to leave the position vacant without appointing the candidate.
The appearance of fairness doctrine does not apply to a mayor’s civil service appointment because it is not a quasi-judicial decision.
Side v. Cheney (1984) – The appearance of fairness doctrine requires quasi-judicial decisions to be “free of any taint of bias.” Quasi-judicial decisions are decisions historically made by courts. A mayor’s civil service appointment is not a quasi-judicial decision because courts have never appointed government officials, and mayors don’t act like judges (i.e. hearing evidence submitted by adverse parties) when appointing civil service candidates. Accordingly, when a civil service commission certifies three qualified police sergeant candidates to the mayor, the mayor can appoint any one of them without an appearance of fairness challenge.
Appointment of a police chief in a council-manager city.
AGO 53-55 No. 245 – In a council-manager form of government the city manager appoints the police chief subject to the statutory procedures in RCW 41.12.010, et seq.
Probationary Periods for Appointed Employees
A city’s one-year probationary period for city police is a valid local variation of RCW 41.12.100.
Samuels v. Lake Stevens (1988) – Cities can enact their own civil service systems that "substantially accomplish" the purpose of chapter 41.12 RCW. Although RCW 41.12.100 provides for a 6 month probationary period, a local civil service rule establishing a longer one-year probationary period is a valid local variation that substantially accomplishes the state law’s purpose of having a probationary period for civil service employees.
Arbogast v. Westport (1977) – Probationary periods in civil service employment allow appointing officials to assess employee efficiency and competency. A city's one-year probationary period for police employees may "substantially accomplish" the purpose of the shorter six-month probationary period in RCW 41.12.100, given widely fluctuating job demands in the city at different times of the year.
Calculating an employee’s probation period.
Olson v. Civil Service Commission (1986) – A police city civil service rule provided that terminated employees only get a hearing if they’ve completed a six-month probationary period. An officer started his employment by working a two-hour shift and the department terminated him exactly 6 months later. When the officer sought a hearing, the city argued the officer’s first two-hour day should not count toward the six-month completion, making him one day short of hearing eligibility. The court disagreed, holding “fractional portions of a day” count toward the passage of six months of probationary work, entitling the officer to a hearing.
McCabe v. Spokane Civil Service (1976) – Probationary periods are designed to allow employers to observe a probationer’s work performance, so only a probationer’s actual service on the job counts toward the completion of probation. A probationer’s time on sick leave without pay doesn’t count—the probationer “must engage in actual service or work for a time equal to the period of probation.”
An appointing authority’s dismissal of a probationer.
AGO 59-60 No. 28 – As the appointing authority, a sheriff who dismisses a probationer is not required to notify the civil service commission of the dismissal basis because dismissed probationary employees have no right to civil service commission review.
Pre-termination Hearings
A pre-termination hearing allows an employee to respond to charges.
Nickerson v. Anacortes (1986) – Public employees can only be terminated for cause, and they are entitled to a pre-termination hearing where they can respond to the employer’s charges in support of the termination decision. The decision maker (in this case the police chief) can conduct the hearing.
A pre-termination hearing is only required before termination, and it need not be elaborate to satisfy due process requirements.
Gibson v. Auburn (1988) – Under Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill (1985), due process gives public employees like police officers the right to a hearing before termination. The court rejected an argument that the hearing right applies even before the employer decides to terminate the employee. As to the hearing itself, it need not be elaborate to satisfy due process requirements. The employee is entitled to notice of the charges against them, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and a chance to give their side of the story, which can be satisfied by an informal conference.
Payne v. Mount (1985) –The Loudermill decision requires that public employees receive a pre-termination "hearing" to satisfy due process. The hearing need not be elaborate, and unlike a full adversarial evidentiary hearing, notice and an opportunity to respond is all that is required.
Loudermill’s pre-termination hearing requirement applies retroactively.
Bullo v. Fife (1988) – A city terminated its dispatcher without a pre-termination hearing about a year before the Loudermill decision. After the Loudermill court rendered its decision, the dispatcher argued that the city’s failure to give her a pre-termination hearing violated due process. The court agreed, holding that statutes like RCW 41.12.080 and RCW 41.12.090 gave the dispatcher a protected property interest in her job, and that Loudermill’s pre-termination hearing requirement applied retroactively to the dispatcher’s termination the year before. The court ruled that if a pretermination hearing would have prevented the dispatcher’s termination, she is entitled to reinstatement with back pay. But if a hearing wouldn’t have prevented termination, the dispatcher can only recover any money damages caused by the city’s failure to offer a hearing.
Employees are entitled to a pre-termination hearing once they complete probation. Permanent civil service employees have property rights in employment and are entitled to pre-termination hearings.
Olson v. Civil Service Commission (1986) – A city police civil service rule provided that terminated employees only get a hearing after completing their 6 month probationary period.
Punton v. Seattle Public Safety Commission (1982) – Permanent civil service employees can be discharged only for cause and they have a property right in continued employment. Due process of law is denied when police departments fail to give these employees a pre-termination hearing according to their regulations.
Employee Discipline and Discharge
Agencies can demote civil service employees for reasons other than misconduct.
Greig v. Metzler (1982) – In addition to misconduct, agencies can demote civil service employees for budgetary reasons, reductions in force, and other like causes.
A civil service employee’s termination is ineffective when delegated to others without termination authority.
State ex rel. West v. Seattle (1963) – A local civil service rule empowered the superintendent to terminate civil service employees, and it did not allow the superintendent to delegate termination decisions to anyone else. The court held an employee’s termination ineffective where the superintendent did not personally terminate the employee nor authorize the termination as the rule required.
Criminal acts can be cause to support an employee’s termination.
Nickerson v. Anacortes (1986) – The court upheld a civil service commission decision that an employee’s unlawful possession and use of marijuana constituted cause for the employee’s termination.
Danielson v. Seattle (1986) – The court upheld a civil service commission decision that a police officer who unlawfully used a another’s credit card was properly discharged for incompetency, insubordination, and conduct unbecoming a police officer.
Non-criminal “conduct unbecoming an officer” as grounds for termination.
State ex rel. Ashing v. Davis (1940) – Where a city charter includes "conduct unbecoming an officer or employee of the city" as cause to remove civil service officers, the alleged conduct does not have to be criminal to support removal.
Court defines “incompetence” as a cause for discipline, and rules that joking behavior is not incompetence.
Eiden v. Snohomish Civil Service Commission (1975) – The court concluded that a deputy sheriff who jokingly answered the phone using another deputy's name was not "incompetent" since he otherwise performed his duties capably. Quoting from a Florida court decision, the court defined "incompetent" as follows:
Incompetency as a ground for suspension and removal has reference to any physical, moral or intellectual quality, the lack of which incapacitate[s] one to perform the duties of his office. Incompetency may arise from gross ignorance of official duties or gross carelessness in the discharge of them. It may also arise from lack of judgment and discretion or from a serious physical or mental effect not present at the time of election, though we do not imply that all physical and mental defects so arising would give ground for suspension.
Hearings Before the Civil Service Commission
Police civil service commissions have no authority to hear citizen complaints about an individual officer’s performance.
AGO 1986 No. 9 – Chapter 41.12 RCW only gives civil service commissions the power to hear (“investigate”) matters related to covered employee removals, suspensions, demotions, or discharges. Commissions have no statutory authority to investigate a citizen’s allegations of official misconduct against an individual police officer.
Patton v. Wheelon (1964) – A citizen cannot require a civil service commission to investigate their complaint against police officers.
An employee who involuntarily resigns is entitled to an investigation and hearing for possible reinstatement.
Micone v. Civil Service Commission (1986) – Discharging a public employee by a coerced or involuntary resignation would be improper because it does not comply with RCW 41.12.090 procedures. An involuntary resignation entitles the employee to reinstatement and possibly back pay. Commissions conduct an investigation and hearing under RCW 41.12.090 to decide whether an employee has resigned voluntarily.
Only permanent employees that have completed probation can appeal their discharge to the commission.
State v. Civil Service Commission (1980) – Civil service probationary periods give appointing officials an opportunity to determine a probationer’s efficiency and competency, and allow unqualified probationers to be discharged before their employment becomes permanent. To preserve this general civil service scheme, only permanent employees that have completed probation can appeal their discharge to the commission. “To hold otherwise would negate the intent of the probationary period which is to simplify the discharge procedures for employees who are found to lack the qualifications necessary for permanent employment.”
Suspended officers can both appeal their suspensions to the commission and seek arbitration through an applicable collective bargaining agreement.
Civil Service Commission v. City of Kelso (1999) – A suspended officer who appeals their suspension to the civil service commission can also seek to arbitrate the suspension under an applicable collective bargaining agreement. Where an officer has two appeal processes available with different substantive rights, the court will not force the officer to choose one unless a collective bargaining agreement between the parties includes a bargained for election of remedies clause.
Removing a civil service officer requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Luellen v. Aberdeen (1944) – Civil service officers can only be removed for cause and after due notice and the opportunity to be heard. An opportunity to be heard has at least three substantial elements: (1) the right to know the charges or claims; (2) the right to meet the charges with witnesses and evidence; and (3) the right to have the aid of counsel. Where a police officer under civil service is removed with no statement of charges or hearing notice, the removal is illegal and of no force or effect.
Adequacy of a discharge notice.
McConnell v. Seattle (1986) – A discharged employee claimed that his discharge notice did not properly include the charges against him or his procedural rights. The court disagreed, finding that a dismissal notice need not specifically include dismissal reasons the employee already knows about, and citing an applicable appeal statute in a notice sufficiently notifies the employee of their appeal deadline.
Deering v. Seattle (1974) – To be constitutionally adequate, a disciplinary notice should reasonably inform the employee of the nature and substance of charges supporting discipline.
State ex rel. Ashing v. Davis (1940) – A civil service discharge notice must be written and sufficiently definite to inform the employee of the character and extent of the charges.
Civil service commission hearings must be impartial.
State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler (1969) – When a city charter gives suspended or discharged civil service employees the right to a hearing, a fair and impartial hearing before an unbiased tribunal is necessarily implied. Accordingly, city civil service commissions cannot conduct an employee’s hearing if they themselves also investigate, accuse, and recommend the employee’s dismissal. If the city’s civil service provisions identify no other hearing tribunal, the superior court has inherent jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy on the merits.
Reynolds v. Kirkland Police Comm. (1963) – Police officers’ suspension and demotion was unfair when the civil service commission investigated the officers, recommended their suspension to the appointing power, formulated accusations against the officers after the suspension, then sat as the appeal board to determine if the actions were proper. Such a hearing was inconsistent with state law and violated due process.
A commission's failure to follow its own hearing rules does not per se violate due process.
Chase v. Spokane Valley Fire Department Civil Service Commission (2007) – A civil service commission's failure to follow its own rules doesn’t always violate due process. Rule violations only fall short of due process if the violated rules represent “minimal due process requirements.” To decide whether civil service hearing procedures violate due process, courts consider: (1) the employee's interest in retaining employment; (2) the government's interest in expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees; and (3) the risk of erroneous termination.
A commission’s failure to put a witness under oath before testimony violates due process.
Nirk v. Kent Civil Serv. Commission (1981) – A commission’s failure to put a testifying hearing witness under oath violated a disciplined officer's due process rights.
Civil service commissions must base their termination decisions on the appointing authority’s dismissal grounds and cannot use their own alternative grounds to support an employee’s termination.
In re Smith (1982) – The sheriff terminated a deputy for unlawfully pointing his gun at motorists. The deputy appealed the termination to the commission, claiming he only flashed a badge and not a gun. The commission ruled that even flashing a badge was intimidation that justified the termination. The court reversed the commission, holding that commissions must confine their decisions to whether the employer’s cited reasons justify termination. Commissions cannot advance their own alternative grounds to support the employer’s decision.
Commissions can reduce or increase employer discipline.
Erickson v. Civil Service Commission (1984) – The sheriff terminated a deputy. The deputy appealed the termination to the commission, who reduced the discipline to a 30-day suspension. The sheriff appealed and claimed that the commission exceeded its authority by reducing the deputy’s discipline. The court upheld the commission’s decision, noting that RCW 41.14.120 gives commissions discretion to modify an employer’s disciplinary decision by either increasing or reducing it.
Pool v. Omak (1984) – Commissions have the authority to alter employer discipline. RCW 41.12.090 allows city police civil service commissions to modify discipline imposed on a city police officer by imposing stricter penalties. Such increases are not per se arbitrary and capricious.
Commissions can reconsider mistaken decisions, but they should first promptly notify the parties.
Hall v. Seattle (1979) – If a commission determines that it made a mistake or misperceived facts, it can reconsider its decision as long as its actions are not arbitrary and capricious. The commission should promptly notify the parties of the reconsideration hearing.
Appeals of Commission Decision to the Courts
Employees have three ways to appeal a commission’s decision.
Pierce County Sheriff v. Civil Service Comm. (1983) – Employees have three ways to appeal a civil service commission’s decision. First, they can appeal if a specific statute (such as RCW 41.14.120) allows it. Second, any party may obtain review of an agency’s decision through a statutory writ of certiorari if the decision involved the agency’s exercise of “judicial functions" (RCW 7.16.040). Third, courts have inherent constitutional power to review "illegal or manifestly arbitrary and capricious action” that violates fundamental rights.
Failure to timely appeal precludes court review.
Pleuss v. Seattle (1972) – Failure to timely appeal a commission decision precludes superior court review.
Court review is limited to determining if an employee’s termination was in good faith, for cause, and without an abuse of commission discretion.
Wenatchee v. Berg (1969) – Court review of civil service commission decisions is limited to deciding whether the commission properly concluded that an employee’s termination was in in good faith and for cause. Further inquiry into the commission’s decision is precluded, unless the commission abused its discretion.
Courts uphold commission decisions unless they are arbitrary and capricious.
Goding v. Civil Service Commission (2016) – A county sheriff suspended a deputy for a without pay and reassigned them to a less desirable department detail. The deputy appealed to the commission which upheld the discipline. The deputy then appealed to the superior court. Superior courts conduct limited reviews of commission decisions and should not overturn them unless the commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously. As a matter of law, commission decisions are not arbitrary and capricious when the commission makes them “with due consideration of the evidence presented at the hearing.”
Helland v. King County Civil Service (1980) – A superior court appeal from a commission decision is limited to determining whether or not commission's actions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The case involved a county sheriff’s civil service exam question that asked whether an old and rarely enforced statute was a crime. An examinee answered that it was, and the commission marked the answer incorrect, theorizing that an unenforced statute technically isn’t a crime as a matter of policy. The court overturned the commission’s decision, holding that because the commission phrased its test question in the literal sense, it was a question of law and not policy. Accordingly, the law leaves room for only one opinion and the commission’s decision about the test answer was arbitrary and capricious.
Butner v. Pasco (1985) – On appellate review under RCW 41.12.090, the reviewing court must uphold the commission’s decision unless it finds the commission’s actions to be arbitrary and capricious, which is defined as actions that are willful, unreasoning and in disregard of the facts and circumstances.
State ex rel. Perry v. Seattle (1966) – A civil service commission decision is not arbitrary and capricious simply because a trial court or the appeals court could have decided differently after reading the record. Where a commission has been established to hold inquiries and to make decisions about whether employees should be terminated, court review is limited to determining whether the employee was given an opportunity to be heard and whether competent evidence supported the employer’s grounds for termination.
Reviewing courts will not substitute their judgment for the civil service commission’s.
Vancouver v. Jarvis (1969) – In reviewing a civil service commission proceeding, the courts cannot substitute their judgment for the independent judgment of the commission.
City employees that prevail in court against their employer can recover wages and attorney’s fees.
Watkins v. Seattle (1940) – Civil service employees are entitled to recover compensation for their wrongful separation from employment.
Arnold v. City of Seattle (2016) – The city demoted a civil service employee from management to an entry-level position with a significant pay reduction. The employee appealed the demotion to the commission, who reversed the demotion and ordered back pay. The commission denied the employee’s request for attorney’s fees because its rules required claimants to pay for their own attorneys. The employee appealed and the court sided with the employee. RCW 49.48.030 allows employees to recover attorney’s fees in any “action” to recover wages from their employer. The court ruled that this civil service proceeding was such an “action” entitling the employee to recover attorney’s fees, and that the state law preempted the commission’s rule.
Terminated employees that claim constructive discharge are not required to seek civil service review before suing in court.
Allstot v. Edwards (2003) – The “exhaustion of administrative remedies” doctrine generally requires terminated public employees to first seek review of their discharge with the civil service commission before bringing their claim in court. But this doctrine doesn’t apply when employees claim constructive discharge because those claims would be difficult or impossible to address under civil service law. For example, RCW 41.12.090 requires employers to make a written accusation against the employee, and the employee must demand the commission’s investigation within 10 days of their termination. But by its nature a constructive discharge claim may lack a single identifiable event leading to termination, and since there is no actual discharge it may be impossible to determine when the employee’s 10 day deadline starts. Accordingly, terminated civil service employees that allege constructive discharge are not required to first seek commission review of their termination before bringing their wrongful constructive discharge claim in court.
A court of appeals is not bound by fact findings a superior court makes from reviewing the record of a civil service commission hearing.
Danielson v. Seattle (1986) – A terminated employee challenged their termination to the civil service commission, who ruled against the employee after a hearing. The employee appealed to the superior court, who reviewed the commission’s record and additional documents. The superior court entered findings of fact that both parties appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals held that when a superior court makes fact findings from reviewing a record and documents with no witness testimony, the appeals court is just as competent as the superior court to weigh and consider the evidence and isn’t bound by the superior court’s findings.
If competent evidence supports an employee’s discharge, courts will not examine the weight or sufficiency of that evidence.
State ex rel. Price v. Seattle (1944) – If competent evidence given at a hearing tends to prove non-frivolous employer reasons for a civil service employee’s discharge, courts will not examine the weight or sufficiency of that evidence.
Ability to Abolish Civil Service Positions
In the interest of economy and efficiency, a city council can in good faith abolish and consolidate civil service positions.
State ex rel. Morris v. Seattle (1940) – In the interest of economy and efficiency, city councils can abolish and consolidate civil service positions, as long as they do so in good faith. Consolidation of civil service positions can mean imposing duties on employees that might come within the purview of other civil service classifications.
Miscellaneous
Civil service commissions are not exempt from collective bargaining duties.
Yakima v. Fire Fighters (1991) – Chapter 41.56 RCW generally requires cities to collectively bargain with their employees regarding personnel matters like wages, hours and employment conditions. RCW 41.56.100 exempts cities that delegate these matters to their civil service commission, but only if the commission “is similar in scope, structure and authority to the state personnel board.” Here the city’s civil service commission is not sufficiently like the state board because the board has far broader powers to address a wide variety of subjects while the commission’s authority is more limited. Accordingly, the city must bargain with its public employees on matters it has delegated to its commission.
A civil service commission’s fact findings may be binding in a later federal civil rights lawsuit.
Shoemaker v. Bremerton (1987) – The city demoted its deputy police chief, who argued that it was retaliatory. The city’s civil service commission disagreed and found no retaliation. The deputy then sued the city in federal court for retaliatory discharge. The parties argued whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel (which prohibits parties from relitigating issues already decided in another proceeding) applied to prevent the deputy from claiming retaliation a second time. The court held that because the commission hearing and lawsuit both involved identical facts and legal issues, collateral estoppel applied to prevent the deputy’s retaliation lawsuit.
Reclassification of civil service positions.
Leonard v. Civil Service Commission (1980) – A municipal civil service commission’s reclassification of positions is a discretionary function that courts can review to ensure that actions taken are legal and not arbitrary or capricious.
Civil service commissions have no authority over pensions.
State ex rel. Johnson v. Funkhouser (1958) – Civil service commissions and disability pension boards have separate and distinct jurisdiction. A commission’s terminating an employee doesn’t affect the employee’s vested right to disability benefits under a pension board’s exclusive jurisdiction.
The seniority of a city police officer transfers to the county sheriff's office.
AGO 1991 No. 27 – RCW 41.14.250 allows city police officers meeting certain requirements to transfer to a county sheriff’s office. RCW 41.14.260 provides that transferring city officers shall have the same rights, benefits and privileges they would have if they had been sheriff’s office employees since the beginning of their city employment. Accordingly, the transferring officer's seniority is measured from their original city hire date.
