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Regulation of Unauthorized Camping, Loitering, and Solicitation of Aid

This page provides examples of local government regulation of unauthorized camping, soliciting aid, and loitering in the public right-of-way. 

For information on homelessness prevention and services, see our pages on Homelessness Prevention & Assistance Programs and Homeless Shelter and Housing Options.

Overview

Homelessness is a complex issue, and cities and counties often must tread a fine line between providing adequate services to individuals experiencing homelessness and attempting to regulate the impact of homelessness in public spaces. Common areas of regulation include soliciting aid, pedestrian and vehicular interference, and sleeping in public spaces. Jurisdictions should use caution when attempting to address these issues because they may have the effect of criminalizing homelessness and be counterproductive to efforts to transition people from homelessness to stable housing. Additionally, some regulations have been found to be unconstitutional.

This page reviews some of the more common areas of regulation – unauthorized sitting, lying, or camping, using vehicles as habitation, soliciting aid, and loitering – and includes information on court decisions that impact a local government’s ability to create regulations addressing these areas.

Ordinances Prohibiting Unauthorized Sitting, Lying, or Camping on Public Property

Many local governments have ordinances that regulate or prohibit sitting, lying, or camping in public places.

In City of Grants Pass v. Johnson (2024), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that local ordinances imposing criminal penalties on acts like public sleeping or camping do not violate the U.S. Constitution’s 8th Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, even if the ordinances apply to unhoused persons who lack local shelter options. The Grants Pass case overturned Martin v. City of Boise (2019), a decision that had previously invalidated such local ordinances on 8th Amendment grounds. See MRSC blog's Camping Revisited: U.S. Supreme Court Changes the Landscape of Penalizing Public Sleeping (2024) for more information about the Grants Pass case.

Despite the Grants Pass ruling, the legality of local ordinances criminalizing public camping remains disputed, with lawsuits pending in Washington and other states.

Several Washington jurisdictions have also enacted “sit-lie” laws that regulate or prohibit sitting or lying down on sidewalks or other public property. Some limit the scope of the law to certain downtown or commercial areas and/or to certain times of the day. Most require enforcers to first notify individuals of the prohibition before issuing a citation. Additionally, these laws commonly include exceptions for individuals in wheelchairs, the injured, and those shopping or waiting at bus stops.

Examples of Public Camping and “Sit-Lie” Ordinances and Codes

Note: The examples below generally predate the Martin v. City of Boise (2019) decision.

Ordinances, Codes, and Procedures Regarding Encampment Property

Local homeless enforcement commonly includes regulations on encampments and procedures for removing encampment property. Several notable court decisions regulate the disposal of property from encampments, including:

  • Kitcheon v. City of Seattle (2024) – City encampment removal procedures are entitled to “rational basis” review when their underlying goal and purpose is to remove encampments posing threats to public safety or public property use. Under rational basis review, localities must “carefully tailor” their encampment removal procedures to meet a “legitimate” government interest.  Local governments have a legitimate interest in regulating encampments to promote public health and safety, but encampment removal procedures are not carefully tailored to meet that interest when they allow immediate removal of encampments from public park property regardless of any posed health or safety hazards.
  • Garcia v. City of Los Angeles (2021) – Lavan’s due process requirements apply equally to “bulky” encampment items, such as mattresses, furniture items or appliances.
  • Lavan v. City of Los Angeles (2012) – Unhoused individuals do not abandon personal property by leaving it temporarily unattended in a public area while completing “necessary tasks such as eating, showering and using restrooms.” Due process requires reasonable notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing and destroying such property.  Notably, the case does not specify a duration of required advance notice, leaving individual jurisdictions to determine appropriate advance notice procedures for encampment removal.

Examples of Encampment Ordinances and Codes

Note: The examples below generally predate the Martin v. City of Boise (2019) decision.

Vehicles Used for Habitation 

Many local jurisdictions regulate vehicle parking and impoundment. However, legal challenges can arise when individuals experiencing homelessness live in parked vehicles. See the following examples: 

  • Potter v. City of Lacey (2024) – The Washington Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance that prohibited parking RVs, trailers, and similar large vehicles on city streets or in city parking lots for more than four hours. Potter lived in his trailer and parked it at city hall. The city ordered Potter to move the trailer or risk impoundment under the city ordinance. Potter complied but challenged the city’s order as violating his constitutional right to travel. The Supreme Court rejected Potter’s challenge, holding that cities have broad authority to regulate vehicle parking for public health and safety, and that a constitutional right to travel doesn’t give individual rights to travel (or reside) in any particular chosen manner.
  • City of Seattle v. Long (2021) – The Washington Supreme Court held that living in a vehicle gives its owner homestead protection. The petitioner Steven Gregory Long owned and lived in his truck. In violation of a city parking ordinance, he parked the truck in a city parking lot for more than 72 hours when it became inoperable. The city impounded the truck, and Long agreed to pay impoundment charges to avoid losing it at auction. Long challenged the City’s impound procedures and the Supreme Court held that Long’s truck qualified as “personal property occupied as a principle residence” that state homestead law automatically protects from forced sale to pay off debts like impoundment charges. For more information and analysis, see MRSC's blog City of Seattle v. Long: Vehicle Homestead Rights and Excessive Fines (2021).

Soliciting Aid

Ordinances regulating soliciting aid (or “begging”) have become contentious among municipalities throughout the country, including in Washington.

Many municipalities have laws restricting soliciting aid in public rights-of-way (such as on major roads), within certain distances of ATMs, or at certain times of day. Localities defend these laws as content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on soliciting aid. However, since aid solicitation often involves written aid requests conveyed on signs, restrictions on soliciting aid may also incidentally regulate First Amendment protected speech.

The court scrutiny given to these laws changed with the United States Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015). In Reed, the Court struck down a town sign code that imposed different regulations on signs depending on their content. The court ruled that government regulations restricting speech content on signs must be as narrow as possible to fulfill a “compelling government interest.”

A year after the Reed decision, the Washington Supreme Court decided City of Lakewood v. Willis (2016), a case involving a Lakewood misdemeanor ordinance that prohibited “begging in restrictive areas.” The city charged Willis with violating the ordinance for walking into traffic lanes while holding a sign soliciting aid at an I-5 off ramp. The Willis Court noted that the “First Amendment protects charitable appeals for funds,” and following Reed’s reasoning struck down the ordinance because it didn’t just regulate Willis’s conduct in creating a potential freeway traffic hazard—it also targeted the “begging” content of Willis’s sign and therefore impermissibly restricted protected speech.

Following Willis, laws prohibiting soliciting aid are generally unconstitutional under the First Amendment due to their restrictions on free speech. However, narrowly drafted pedestrian and vehicular interference ordinances may pass muster if they regulate conduct (blocking the right-of-way) instead of speech or expression. 

In response to City of Lakewood v. Willis, some jurisdictions repealed their solicitation ordinances. Examples include:

Pedestrian and Vehicular Interference

Some jurisdictions have adopted narrowly focused laws that identify and prohibit interference with vehicles and pedestrians in the public right-of-way. Since these ordinances regulate conduct instead of speech or expression, they are not as constitutionally problematic as prohibitions on soliciting aid. However, jurisdictions should remove or avoid provisions in their vehicle and pedestrian interference ordinances related to “aggressive begging” or “aggressive solicitation" as these may be interpreted to focus on speech and not conduct.

In addition, other offenses (such as disorderly conduct, harassment and assault) may address the concerns associated with aggressive begging or solicitation without implicating constitutional speech protections.

Examples of Pedestrian and Vehicular Interference Codes

  • DuPont Municipal Code Sec. 9.17.030 – Defines obstructing pedestrian or vehicular traffic as walking, standing, sitting, laying, or placing an object in such a manner as to block passage by another person or driver of a vehicle or to cause another person or driver of a vehicle to take evasive action to avoid physical contact. 
  • Normandy Park Municipal Code Ch. 10.34 – Prohibits pedestrian interference with vehicles on roadways and interference with vehicle sight distance.
  • Sumner Municipal Code Ch. 9.48 – Prohibits intentional interruption or obstruction of pedestrian or vehicular traffic by walking, standing, sitting, laying, or placing an object in such a manner as to block passage.

Loitering

Like solicitation, general loitering ordinances have been found to violate constitutional protections by being either too vague or too overbroad. However, banning loitering that relates to other illegal activities (such as drug activity or prostitution) has been upheld when the regulation sufficiently describes additional conditions that would make loitering illegal.

Washington Court Decisions Regarding Loitering

  • Spokane v. Neff (2004) – Found that an ordinance prohibiting loitering by a “known prostitute” is void for vagueness when it does not define the term. 
  • Seattle v. Slack (1989) – Found that an ordinance prohibiting loitering by a “known prostitute” is constitutional when the term is defined and the ordinance requires criminal intent (in addition to loitering).
  • Seattle v. Drew (1967) – Challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance that made it a crime for any person loitering abroad, or abroad under suspicious circumstances, from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise, to fail to give a satisfactory account of their person upon the demand of any police officer. The state Supreme Court found the ordinance too vague, and therefore, in violation of state and federal constitutional protections.

Recommended Resources

MRSC 

Washington Local Governments


Last Modified: March 19, 2025